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Abstract—Secure semiconductor devices usually destroy key 
material on tamper detection. However, data remanence effect in 
SRAM and Flash/EEPROM makes secure erasure process more 
challenging. On the other hand, data integrity of the embedded 
memory is essential to mitigate fault attacks and Trojan 
malware. Data retention issues could influence the reliability of 
embedded systems. Some examples of such issues in industrial 
and automotive applications are presented. When it comes to the 
security of semiconductor devices, both data remanence and data 
retention issues could lead to possible data recovery by an 
attacker. This paper introduces a new power glitching technique 
that reduces the data remanence time in embedded SRAM from 
seconds to microseconds at almost no cost. This would definitely 
help in designing systems with better secret key guarding. Data 
remanence in non-volatile memory could be influenced in the 
same way. The effect of data remanence and data retention on 
hardware security is discussed and possible countermeasures are 
suggested. This should raise awareness among the designers of 
secure embedded systems. 
Keywords—data remanence; data retention; SRAM; EEPROM; 
Flash; glitching; hardware security; PUF; PRNG 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Semiconductor memory in the form of Static RAM 
(SRAM) was introduced in 1960s. It was later found to have 
data remanence problems similar to magnetic media with 
reliable data deletion [1,2,3,4]. Reprogrammable non-volatile 
memory (NVM) was first introduced as EEPROM in late 
1970s and then as Flash in 1980s. They were also found to be 
affected by data remanence [5,6]. As a result, there is 
possibility that some information can still be extracted from 
previously erased memory. This could create problems with 
secure devices where designers assumed that all sensitive 
information is gone once the memory is erased. If the 
passwords or secret keys can be extracted afterwards, it could 
affect confidentiality of the previously encrypted information. 
Reliability of data storage is paramount for modern 
embedded systems. Many people have come across situations 
when some microcontroller-based systems started behaving 
odd or stopped working. This might be home appliances, cars, 
industrial equipment etc. It seems that a serious reliability issue 
was overlooked and we might see more systems and devices 
starting to behave unpredictably or stop working. If it is a 
toaster or microwave oven you can cope, but what about old 
electronics equipment used in cars, aircrafts and industrial 
infrastructure? Previous research on car systems showed how 
the malfunction of certain car modules could pose a serious 
threat to passengers [7,8]. In this research possible cause of 
embedded systems sporadic failures was found and this could 
have very serious consequences. 
In the 1980s, it was realised that low temperatures can 
increase the data retention time of SRAM to many seconds or 
even minutes. With the devices available at that time, it was 
found that increased data retention started at about −20°C and 
increased as temperature fell further [2]. Some devices are 
therefore designed with temperature sensors; any drop below 
−20°C is treated as a tampering event and results in immediate 
memory zeroisation [9,10]. The experiments described in this 
paper are set to measure the data remanence in modern 
microcontrollers to see if the low temperature data remanence 
still exists in embedded devices. 
Usually the data remanence problem is tackled by wrapping 
the device into tamper protection enclosure with temperature 
sensors to prevent freezing and tamper sensors to detect 
intrusion [9,10,11]. This gives enough time to safely wipe 
secret key off the memory contents. However, designing a 
device with embedded SRAM having a low data remanence 
comes at a cost. This often requires modifying the SRAM cells 
to incorporate an additional destruction signal [12]. On practice 
this means that developers have very narrow choice of 
microcontrollers and system-on-chip (SoC) devices with such 
capability. For example, Maxim Integrated (former Dallas 
Semiconductor) offer secure microcontroller DS5250 with two 
self-destruct inputs which on activation wipe off the memory 
contents within microseconds [13]. Data remanence in NVM is 
usually defeated by several cycles of erasing and overwriting 
operations [6]. However, this cannot be accomplished in a 
short time especially for devices with a large memory size. 
Chip manufacturers do not publish information about 
remanence effects in their chips. Of course, a developer can run 
data remanence tests on a selected batch of suitable chips. But 
this would take time and add cost to the design. The outcome 
of this research can be used to improve the protection of secure 
systems which use SRAM as a source of randomness and 
unique keys. First are used in pseudo random number 
generators (PRNG) employed in many cryptographic protocols. 
Others are used to derive unique keys from physical unclonable 
functions (PUF). By reducing the data remanence time the 
contents of the SRAM can be refreshed more often and with 
higher randomness. 
The research presented in this paper demonstrates that 
SRAM data remanence problem still exists in modern 
microcontrollers and like before deteriorates at low 
temperatures. This paper offers a low-cost solution to 
completely eliminate the data remanence problem at almost no 
cost. It also demonstrates that Flash/EEPROM can be affected 
in the same way and this could have influence on the security 
of embedded systems. Data retention can affect reliability of 
automotive and industrial systems. The results of this research 
should be of considerable concern to the developers of secure 
devices. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Embedded systems are often based on microcontrollers – 
small integrated circuits with SRAM, ROM, EEPROM and 
Flash on a single silicon die. 
Security engineers are interested in the period of time for 
which an SRAM device will retain data once the power has 
been removed. This is because many products do cryptographic 
and  other  security-related  computations  using  secret  keys  
or  other  variables  that  the  equipment’s operator must not be 
able to read out or alter. The usual solution is for the secret data 
to be kept in volatile memory inside a tamper-sensing 
enclosure. On detection of a tampering event, the volatile 
memory chips are powered down or even shorted to ground.  If 
the data retention time exceeds the time  required  by  an  
opponent  to  open  the  device  and  power  up  the memory,  
then  the  protection mechanisms can be defeated. 
On power up the symmetric SRAM cells are tend to go 
more likely into one of the states 0 or 1. Each chip has unique 
and uncontrollable biases for each memory cell that depends on 
the intrinsic properties of semiconductor production. This helps 
to distinguish between each individual chip as well as use this 
for each device having unique PUF key for encryption. 
However, data remanence imposes some limitations on the 
time between each initialisation. Otherwise either random 
numbers will be predictable or the data used in PUF will 
always be the same making cloning much easier. 
Another important thing to keep in mind is that security 
information could be restored even if part of the memory is 
corrupted. If an attacker has correctly restored only 90% of the 
128-bit key he will have to search through n!/(m!(n–m)!) = 
128!/(115!13!) = 2.12×1017 ~ 258 possible keys. This is feasible 
to calculate in an hour with a medium-size cluster of computers 
or by using special hardware key cracker device. If only 80% 
of the information is known an attacker will need 2.51×1026 ~ 
288 searches. Having even 100 times the capability, the attacker 
will spend more than a million years searching for the key. To 
simplify data remanence time calculations we assume that if 
50% of information is lost then the key cannot be recovered 
anymore. 
Unlike SRAM, which has only two stable logic states, 
EPROM, EEPROM and Flash cells store analog values in the 
form of a charge on the floating gate of a MOS transistor. The 
floating-gate charge shifts the threshold voltage of the cell 
transistor and this is detected with a sense amplifier when the 
cell is read. 
Programmed floating-gate memories cannot store 
information forever. Up until late 90s these cells were not 
robust enough and usually held the charge for only 10–20 
years. The failure mechanisms of EEPROM and Flash memory 
cells are well known. Various processes, such as field-assisted 
electron emission, de-trapping of electrons and ionic 
contamination, cause the floating gate to lose its charge, and 
this increases at higher temperatures [14]. Flash memory 
inherited similar data retention problems associated with the 
nature of data storage on a floating gate from the EEPROM. 
The failure rate doubles every ten degrees [15]. Another failure 
mode in the very thin tunnel oxides used in Flash memories is 
programming disturb, where unselected erased cells adjacent to 
selected cells gain charge when the selected cell is written. This 
is not enough to change the cell threshold sufficiently to upset a 
normal read operation, but could cause problems to the data 
retention time. Typical guaranteed data retention time for 
EPROM, EEPROM and Flash memories are 10, 40 and 100 
years respectively. Those figures are usually refer to operating 
temperatures up to 85ºC. When devices are operating at higher 
temperatures, like in automotive applications up to 125ºC, the 
data retention time is likely to be reduced to just a few years. 
There is a certain probability of distribution of weak cells 
which pass the initial testing after fabrication but cannot hold 
as much charge as normal cells. This could be caused by 
process variation during the fabrication, e.g. defect in material 
or contamination of masks or reagents. They could also be 
introduced by partial failures in the array control logic resulting 
in lower write voltage or shorter write time. These cells are 
likely to lose their charge and fail much faster especially during 
high temperature operation [16]. 
Failures of several embedded systems were investigated 
during this research. One was a failure in SCADA (supervisory 
control and data acquisition) [17] controllers used in the energy 
supply industry. Although company engineers were able to 
locate the cause of the system failure being the Motorola 
MC68HC11A1 microcontroller [18], they were unable to 
figure out why the microcontroller fails after certain time. It 
turned out that although hardware engineers did learn the 
specification and avoided possible data corruption problem, 
they were unable to predict that some other parameters could 
change during the device lifetime. These parameters are set at 
the chip factory after fabrication and testing and in most cases 
end users have no need to change them. Similar failures were 
detected in some car models where engine control unit stopped 
working after 8–10 years or car keys 'forgot' their encryption 
keys used for communication after 12 years. In those cases the 
cost of repair was substantial. 
In many chips EEPROM and Flash cells could also be the 
part of configuration and security fuses. These fuses can 
control the size of available SRAM, EEPROM and Flash 
memory. In some microcontrollers the configuration is user 
accessible and even. In MC68HC11A1 the user can configure 
the OPTION register and select whether the ROM, EEPROM 
 
 
and watchdog timer are enabled. If the ROM is disabled, the 
chip can only work with external memory. Usually chip 
manufacturers do not specify the data retention time for the 
chip configuration fuses despite to most of them being based 
on standard EEPROM cells. Hence, for system hardware 
engineer it would be natural to overlook the important 
parameters omitted by the manufacturer. The consequences 
could be devastating especially for high risk applications. 
Memory technologies have significantly improved over the 
past 20 years. Most modern microcontrollers have guaranteed 
data retention time of over 40 years, but not all manufacturers 
specify the data retention parameters. Up until mid 2000s the 
microcontrollers with only 10 years of guaranteed data 
retention time were still manufactured. If they ended up in 
critical systems this could pose some serious problems. 
Although the mechanisms associated with data retention are 
well known and investigated, this does not eliminate the 
chances of failures caused by configuration memory especially 
as this memory cannot be easily tested in some cases. 
When it comes to the hardware security, data recovery 
becomes the major concern. An attacker could potentially 
reverse engineer the embedded system by extracting all the 
information from embedded memory. Mask ROM is usually 
the easiest target because the information is stored in the form 
of present or absent transistor. This in some cases could be 
directly observed under optical microscope [19]. In other cases 
selective etching or microprobing would help [20,21]. 
Flash/EEPROM would require more sophisticated methods as 
the information is stored in the form of electrical charge. That 
means that either atomic force microscope (AFM) [22] or 
scanning electron micrposcope (SEM) [23] will be required. 
SRAM extraction is the most challenging task, because any 
interruption of the power supply could result in data loss. Also 
the switching energy of the memory cell is several orders of 
magnitude lower than in Flash/EEPROM. This makes SRAM 
the most secure storage. However, the requirement for having 
battery limits the areas of applications. 
III. EXPERIMENTS 
As targets for the SRAM experiments the following 
microcontrollers were selected: Freescale (former Motorola) 
MC68HC908AZ60 [24] and MC68HC908AZ60A[25], Texas 
Instruments MSP430F112 [26] and MSP430F427 [27]. Several 
samples of each type were tested to measure the variation of 
data remanence time between devices within the same family. 
For the non-volatile memory experiments the following 
microcontrollers were selected: Microchip PIC16F873 [28], 
Atmel ATmega163 [29] and ATtiny12 [30], Motorola 
MC68HC11A1 and MC68HC11A8 [18]. Special test boards 
were built to efficiently communicate with the devices and test 
their embedded SRAM and Flash/EEPROM memory. The 
boards were connected to a PC with controlling software via 
RS-232 interface. 
In the first set of experiments the chips were tested for 
SRAM data remanence at room temperature (+20ºC), low 
temperatures down to –30ºC and high temperatures up to 
+80ºC. For that each device was first initialised with data 
patterns in SRAM then powered down for different periods of 
time before powering it up and reading its memory contents. 
Both Motorola and Texas Instruments microcontrollers have 
on-chip monitor ROM which allows communication via RS-
232 interface, hence, no special on-chip software is necessary 
to access embedded SRAM. 
Previous research revealed that grounding power supply 
line to the device can significantly reduce data remanence time 
[4]. Therefore all used pins of the microcontroller were forced 
to GND at the start of measuring period. For temperature 
control a stacked Peltier elements with fan air cooling were 
used. For temperature monitoring a standard digital 
thermometer was used with external thermocouple and 0.1ºC 
resolution. 
The next set of experiments with SRAM was aimed at 
verifying the new idea of how data remanence is affected by 
power glitching. Instead of a smooth power down process on 
the VCC line (Figure 1, blue trace), the switching was 
performed with deliberate overshooting (orange trace). This 
was achieved by designing a special power supply unit 
controlled by a PC where the power supply voltage was 
sampled by digital-to-analog converter. The overshooting 
glitch was formed by an operational amplifier with capacitive 
load. Then the signal was buffered to supply enough current to 
the device under test. The amplitude of the glitch was regulated 
on the test board using passive LCR low pass filters. 
 
Fig. 1. Power down process on VCC line: blue – normal, orange – glitch 
The same glitching experiments were repeated for the 
process of secure erasure of Flash/EEPROM in Microchip and 
Atmel microcontrollers. Chip manufacturers claim that the 
process of chip erase is performed in a way that the information 
from code and data memory is removed well before the 
security fuses are reset. The glitching could have effect on that 
process, like it had on SRAM data remanence. The 
microcontrollers were programmed with a test pattern then 
secured by setting their security fuses. The power glitches of 
different duration and amplitude were applied before starting 
the chip erase operation. Then after 100ms time the chip was 
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powered down for 1 second before checking the state of its 
memory and fuses. 
Another experiment was carried out on a partially working 
old optical microscope Leitz Ergolux. The electronic board 
inside its controller was behaving odd thus sometimes moving 
the stage and lenses unexpectedly. Inside the controller was a 
microprocessor-based board. The problem was rectified by 
reading the 2764 EPROM IC at different voltages and then 
reprogramming the same memory chip. Similar issues with 
EPROM and EEPROM reliability were found in many old 
cars. Car repair garages have to deal with many old electronic 
blocks in cars which failed after some loss of data. Refreshing 
the embedded memory inside microcontrollers solved the 
problem in 90% cases. 
The final set of experiments was performed to measure data 
retention time in Motorola MC68HC11Ax microcontrollers. 
For that a UV light was used as an ageing source to establish 
how the memory cells lose their charge and what effect this has 
on the chip operation. To access the die the sample of 
MC68HC11A1 chip was decapsulated with standard process 
using fuming nitric acid [20]. The UV erasure experiments 
were aimed at speeding up the ageing process to observe how 
the memory cells lose their charge and any correlation with 
OPTION register. 
IV. RESULTS 
Data remanence results at room temperature for four 
microcontrollers are presented in Figure 2. The time coordinate 
is in logarithmic scale as this helps to see the transition clearer. 
The older Motorola microcontroller MC68HC908AZ60 has the 
longest data remanence time, while Texas Instrument 
microcontroller MSP430F112 has the shortest time. Figure 3 
shows distribution of data remanence time between nine 
different samples of similar devices – three of 
MC68HC908AZ60, three of MC68HC908AZ60A (mask 
2J74Y) and three of MC68HC908AZ60A (mask 3K85K). As it 
can be observed, differences between data remanence time of 
samples from the same batch could be larger than between 
average samples of different devices. 
 
Fig. 2. Data remanence effect in different microcontrollers 
At low temperature the data remanence time is expectedly 
increased (Figure 4) for both Motorola and Texas Instruments 
microcontrollers. The time was counted to the moment when 
50% of cells lost their state. The data remanence time is 
accelerated at temperatures below 0ºC. This leads to seconds 
for MSP430F112 and minutes for MC68HC908AZ60A at –
30ºC. At higher temperature the data remanence time is 
reduced to milliseconds for MC68HC908AZ60A at +80ºC. In 
the logarithmic scale of Figure 4 the temperature dependency 
of data remanence is almost linear. 
 
Fig. 3. Data remanence difference between batches 
 
Fig. 4. Temperature dependence of data remanence time 
The effect of power glitching on the data remanence time 
was very significant for all samples of tested microcontrollers. 
For all microcontrollers the memory contents was completely 
wiped off to a random state with as short as 5µs glitch 
(Figure 1). Even for the MSP430F112 microcontroller which 
normally has about 8ms data remanence time at room 
temperature this is a thousand times improvement. While for 
MC68HC908AZ60A microncontroller with half a second data 
remenence time it is significantly better. At low temperatures 
the glitching helps with the same efficiency – the data 
remanence time reduced from several minutes to a few 
microseconds. This effect is likely to be caused by a quick 
discharge of SRAM cells transistors into negatively biased 
power line. At the same time the short and controlled glitch 
pulse does not cause a latch-up effect in CMOS transistors. 
Power glitching of EEPROM and Flash microcontrollers 
was different from the SRAM. For all tested samples of 
Microchip PIC16F873, and Atmel ATmega163 and ATtiny12, 
the glitching caused data retention of the main EEPROM and 
Flash memory to increase at a certain threshold. At the same 
time the security fuses were unaffected. This resulted in the 
security of those microcontrollers being circumvented once the 
glitching pulse was large enough. Because the chip erase 
process is internally timed, it is not possible to erase the 
memory forever. If it is not erased within 20ms the control 
circuit shuts down the erasure process. 
The final set of experiments was carried out on 
decapsulated Motorola MC68HC11A1 microcontroller for the 
purpose of finding out if the data retention time of the 
configuration fuses is the same as for the on-chip EEPROM. 
The chip manufacturer specifies EEPROM data retention time 
as at least 10 years, however, it does not specify that time for 
the EEPROM bits of OPTION register. 
Close look at the die revealed all important areas in the 
embedded EEPROM. Partial reverse engineering of the 
memory physical map was carried out using semi-invasive 
methods [19]. For that different parts of the EEPROM array on 
the decapsulated sample were exposed to UV light after 
programming the memory. Writing 0's into the memory causes 
the cells' transistors to store the charge. When the charge is 
removed with UV light the memory cell is read as '1' or erased 
state. One of the EEPROM blocks has extra row line and it 
turned out that the part of it is used for storing the OPTION 
register. The additional EEPROM cells look exactly the same 
as the normal EEPROM memory cells. Therefore, their 
behavior and parameters should remain the same. In order to 
compare the data retention time of those special cells with 
normal cells, the dependency of the data retention from the UV 
exposure time was measured. The time when half of the cells 
have lost their charge was 45 minutes and was identical for 
both areas. This suggests that the data retention parameters of 
the EEPROM could be used to estimate the guaranteed 
retention time for the OPTION register. 
The consequence of unintentional change of the OPTION 
register contents could be devastating. This is because this 
register controls the presence of ROM and EEPROM in the 
memory map. While the EEPROM corruption could be 
mitigated using error correction techniques, sudden change of 
the memory layout will likely cause the system to crash. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The research presented in this paper showed that data 
remanence still exists in modern microcontrollers. For some 
devices the effect could be very serious and allow to keep the 
secret information and keys for several seconds at room 
temperature. At low temperature down to –30ºC it could 
increase to minutes. Previous solutions were either too 
expensive (special SRAM cells) or bulky (tamper enclosure 
with temperature sensors). Heating up the chip might help a bit, 
but might not be suitable due to excessive heat and bulky 
design. This paper introduces a solution to that problem which 
reduces the data remanence time to a few microseconds thus 
completely eliminating the effect. The cost of the proposed 
solution is very low as it is completely non-invasive. The 
method of significant reduction of data remanence time can be 
used for SRAM based PUF and PRNG devices in order to 
speed up the process of key generation. 
Data remanence time varies between different families of 
microcontrollers and between devices within each family 
because of variation between transistors. Therefore, secure 
system designers should test wide range of samples to ensure 
their robustness against data remanence at wide range of 
conditions for all samples. 
Data remanence in non-volatile memory could be 
influenced as well. However, in that case it could have severe 
effect on security. It might be possible to increase data 
retention time of the main Flash/EEPROM memory in a way 
that it would not lose the data fast enough during mass erase 
used for secure reprogramming. As a result the protection fuse 
will be disabled earlier than expected thus leaving the on-chip 
memory contents intact. This would compromise the security 
of the chip. Modern microcontrollers should be properly tested 
by the manufacturers to avoid such situations where protection 
fuse is erased earlier than the main memory as a result of 
power glitching. 
Interconnection between data retention and data remanence 
was discussed with real examples in automotive and industrial 
systems. This research has demonstrated that old 
semiconductor devices with embedded EEPROM and Flash 
memory could pose serious reliability issues by starting 
malfunctioning after 10–20 years. For some devices the system 
design engineers could be completely unaware about possible 
problems because the chip manufacturer might not specify 
parameters of the EEPROM cells used for internal factory 
debug and testing purposes. However, when those cells change 
their state through normal ageing process the device operation 
will be affected. Although ageing of microcontrollers is a 
concern for industry, it was mainly investigated for space 
applications rather than automotive and industrial ones. Also, 
none of those investigations were aimed at security aspects but 
rather on software integrity, data storage and limited number of 
reprogramming cycles for Flash/EEPROM storage. 
The danger of widely used microcontroller-based systems 
going into sporadic failures is hard to overestimate. Electronic 
modules in old cars sometime start to play up, however, this is 
often being treated as normal ageing failure, hence, the owner 
or insurance company pays the bill. However, the underlying 
problem is much deeper. The outcome and cause of the 
problem could be devastating for other industries as it lies at 
intersection between hardware, software, reliability and 
security. For most chips manufacturers guarantee at least 40 
years of data retention time. However, if chips are operating at 
higher temperatures, like in automotive applications, their 
actual data retention time could be much shorter. 
There are several ways how the retention time of the special 
cells can be improved. For example, multiple cells can be used 
to reduce the probability of a failure caused by a single cell. 
Another way is to design special cells which lose charge slower 
than normal ones. Also, the devices should be better tested for 
the use in critical applications. 
Latest SoCs and microcontrollers have extended lifetime of 
embedded NVM. However, emerging memory technologies 
could have reliability issues. More robust testing will be 
required to make sure that automotive parts will still be fully 
functional after 20 years in adverse conditions. 
There are other implications from undocumented features 
present in many chips and mainly used for factory failure 
analysis and debugging purposes. In this case the hardware 
design engineers will be unaware of possible problems and 
outcomes unless they could afford to scan the device for 
undocumented features [31]. 
The results presented in this paper were based on mid-range 
8-bit and 16-bit microcontrollers built with 0.8µm to 0.25µm 
process. It would be beneficial to expand it with measurements 
applied to higher density devices down to 90nm process and 
beyond. Those devices are likely to have lower data remanence 
due to higher leakage in SRAM cells. However, lower 
operating voltage could compensate this making them still 
vulnerable to data remanence. 
More robust testing and evaluation must be performed on 
semiconductor devices going into sensitive applications with 
high risk factors like in car, aviation and medical industries as 
well as critical infrastructure. For those systems which remain 
in the field it would be beneficial to carry out risk assessment 
and reprogram or upgrade the hardware. 
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